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No. 20060853-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL STRAND and CARI ALLEN, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
DIANA TELFER, and JANE DOES (1-5), 
Defendants-Appellees, 
ANSWER BRIEF OF APPELLEE DIANA TELFER 
Defendant-Appellee Diana Telfer submits this brief in answer to 
the Brief of Appellants Michael Strand and Cari Allen. 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of dismissal of the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered on 
August 21, 2006. R. 121-24; Add. A. Appellants filed their notice of 
appeal on September 18, 2006. R. 125-26. This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (West 2004) 
providing for jurisdiction in this Court over cases transferred to the 
Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
Issues Presented 
1. The trial court correctly granted Telfer's motion to dismiss 
because Telfer is absolutely immune from claims of libel and 
slander 
Telfer was an attorney guardian ad litem who was appointed to 
represent the children in a divorce action. Utah law is clear that 
attorneys are absolutely immune from any and all claims arising out of 
statements that are relevant to and made in the course of judicial 
proceedings. Is Telfer immune from the appellants' claims of libel and 
slander arising out of statements she made in a motion for temporary 
restraining order and supporting memorandum filed in the divorce 
action? 
A. Standard of review 
'When determining whether a trial court properly granted a 
motion to dismiss, [this Court] accept[s] the factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and consider[s] them, and all reasonable inferences to 
be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
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party." Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28 <H 2, 20 R3d 895. The trial court's 
decision to grant a motion to dismiss raises a question of law, which 
this Court reviews for correctness, according no deference to the trial 
court. Id. 
B. Preservation of issue 
This issue was preserved in Telfer's motion to dismiss. R. 58-67. 
The trial court granted Telfer's motion to dismiss on this basis on 
August 21, 2006. R.121-24. 
Determinative Constitutional 
Provisions, Statutes, and Rules 
This appeal turns on the common law judicial proceeding 
privilege. Therefore, there are no determinative constitutional 
provisions, statutes, or rules. 
Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action for damages for libel and slander. R. 1-54. Appellee 
Telfer was an attorney guardian ad litem appointed to represent the 
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interests of the children of Rex Strand and Renee Strand, who were 
involved in a divorce. Rex Strand is appellant Michael Strand's 
("Strand") brother. Appellant Cari Allen is Strand's girlfriend. Neither 
Strand nor Allen was a party to the divorce action. 
Telfer submitted a motion for temporary restraining order and 
supporting memorandum in the divorce action. R. 17-25. The 
memorandum contained certain statements about Strand and Allen 
which Strand and Allen allege are false. They seek damages for libel 
and slander. 
Under the judicial proceeding privilege, Telfer is immune from 
Strand's and Allen's claims because the allegedly false statements were 
relevant to and made in the course of a judicial proceeding in which 
Telfer was acting as counsel. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
In April 2006 Michael Strand and Cari Allen commenced this action 
by filing a Complaint in Second District Court. R. 1-54. In addition to 
Telfer, Strand and Allen named five Does as defendants. R. 1. However, 
the plaintiffs never amended the complaint to name any specific 
individual other than Telfer. 
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Pursuant to Telfer's motion, venue was changed to the Third District 
Court and the case was assigned to the Honorable Joseph Fratto. R. 99-
103. Before venue was changed, Telfer filed a motion to dismiss. The 
motion was fully briefed, R. 58-67, 75-86,106-13, and the parties 
presented oral argument to Judge Fratto. R. 144. On August 21, 2006, 
the court entered its Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and Dismissing 
the Case with Prejudice. R. 121-24; Add. A. Because the plaintiffs had 
never amended the complaint to add specific individuals, the trial 
court's order resolved all claims against all parties. Strand and Allen 
filed a notice of appeal on September 19, 2006. R. 125-26. 
Statement of the Facts 
The facts are taken from Strand and Allen's complaint. 
In 2005 Rex Strand was involved in a divorce from his wife, Renee. 
R. 2. Telfer was appointed as guardian ad litem for Rex and Renee's 
children. R. 3. Rex is appellant Strand's brother. R. 2 Allen is appellant 
Strand's girlfriend. Neither of the appellants was a party to the divorce 
action. 
When Rex and Renee separated, Rex moved in with Strand and 
Allen. R.2. Some time later, Telfer filed a motion for temporary 
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restraining order and supporting memorandum in the divorce action. R. 
17-25. The motion requested a change of custody to Renee during the 
divorce and argued that it was not in the Strand children's best interest 
to have frequent contact with Strand and Allen, or to stay in their home 
while they visited their father. R. 24-25. 
Strand and Allen allege that the motion and supporting 
memorandum "contained numerous misstatements and [were] glutted 
with salacious innuendo's [sic] involving plaintiffs Michael Strand and 
Cari Allen's, lifestyles, living conditions, personal character, past 
experience and dress attire." R. 3. Appellants allege that Telfer "knew 
or should have known this information to be false, malicious and 
wrong." R. 4. 
Strand and Allen filed a complaint against Telfer raising claims for 
slander and libel and seeking punitive damages. Strand and Allen seek 
$400,000 in damages from Telfer. R. 15. 
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Summary of the Argument 
The trial court properly dismissed Strand's and Allen's complaint 
because Telfer is entitled to immunity under the judicial proceeding 
privilege. Strand and Allen sued Telfer for libel and slander for 
statements Telfer made in court papers she filed in her capacity as 
guardian ad litem for the Strand children in their parents' divorce 
action. Thus, the allegedly inaccurate statements were made by an 
attorney and were relevant to and made in the course of a judicial 
proceeding. Under Utah law, Telfer is immune from Strand's and 
Allen's claims. 
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Argument 
1. The trial court correctly granted Telfer's motion to dismiss 
because Telfer is absolutely immune from claims of libel and 
slander 
This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of Telfer's motion to 
dismiss because the court correctly ruled that Telfer is protected by the 
judicial proceeding privilege. 
'The general rule is that judges, jurors, witnesses, litigants, and 
counsel involved in a judicial proceeding have an absolute privilege 
against suits alleging defamation." Krouse, 2001 UT, <jl 8, 20 P.3d 895. 
The common law judicial proceeding privilege is intended to promote 
the integrity of the adjudicatory proceeding and its truth finding 
processes." DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, % 10, 992 P.2d 979. 
Accordingly, "[a]n attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish 
false and defamatory matter of another in communications . . . during 
the course and as part of a judicial proceeding in which [shel 
participates as counsel, if it has some relation thereto." Price v. Armour, 
949 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 1997) (quoting Beezley v. Hansen, 4 Utah 2d 
64, 286 P.2d 1057, 1058 (1955)). Attorneys are entitled to immunity 
because they act '"in furtherance of [an] interest of social importance, 
which is entitled to protection even at the expense of uncompensated 
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harm to the plaintiffs reputation."' Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307,1311 
(Utah 1990) (quoting W. Prosser & P. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 114 
(5th ed. 1984)). 
A three part test has been established to determine whether a 
statement is protected by the judicial proceeding privilege. Krouse, 2001 
UT, f 8, 20 P.3d 895. "To establish the judicial proceeding privilege, the 
statements must be (1) "made during or in the course of a judicial 
proceeding"; (2) "have some reference to the subject matter of the 
proceeding"; and (3) be "made by someone acting in the capacity of 
judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel."'" Id. (quoting DeBry, 1999 
UT, f 11, 922 P.2d 979). 
The trial court's application of the judicial proceeding privilege was 
unquestionably correct in this case. First, Telfer made the allegedly 
inaccurate statements in the course of a judicial proceeding-she 
included them in support of a motion for temporary restraining order 
she filed on behalf of the children in Rex and Renee's divorce case. 
Second, the statements were relevant to the divorce proceeding because 
they related to child custody and visitation. In fact, the purpose of the 
motion was to seek a change of custody to Renee during the pendency of 
the divorce proceedings. Third, the statements were made by Telfer in 
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her capacity as guardian ad litem for the children. While Strand and 
Allen argue that Telfer was acting outside the scope of her duties as 
guardian ad litem when she filed the motion, Op. Br. at 27-28, this is 
plainly not the case. 
Moreover, this case illustrates well the importance of the privilege. 
Telfer's position requires her, at times, to make statements bearing on 
the best interests of children that are not flattering to parents or other 
family members. Telfer, along with all other guardians ad litem, would 
be unduly limited in their roles as advocates if they were subjected to 
liability for making such statements. Attorneys such as Telfer must be 
free of the chilling effects of potential liability if they are to zealously 
protect the interests of their clients. See Price, 949 P.2d at 1258. 
(holding that purpose of judicial privilege is to "ensure free and open 
expression by all participants in judicial proceedings by alleviating any 
and all fear that participation will subject them to the risk of 
subsequent legal actions"). 
Strand and Allen do not allege that Telfer disclosed the motion and 
supporting memorandum to anyone outside the divorce proceedings. 
Nevertheless, they argue on appeal that Telfer's statements were not 
privileged because she published them more broadly than necessary. 
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Op. Br. at 30. Relying on Utah's child abuse reporting statutes, Strand 
and Allen suggest that Telfer's submission of information to the court 
constituted unnecessarily broad publication because the Division of 
Child and Family Support was the only proper recipient of the 
information. Id. 
However, Strand and Allen did not argue before the trial court that 
the elements of the judicial proceeding privilege are not met in this 
case. Instead, they argued, first, that the allegations of their complaint 
were sufficiently specific to pass muster under Rule 12(b)(6). R. 76-78. 
Second, misapprehending the judicial proceeding privilege as a 
qualified rather than an absolute privilege, they argued that Telfer 
must first raise the privilege as an affirmative defense before the 
burden shifted to Strand and Allen to show why the privilege should 
not apply. R. 78-81. 
Strand and Allen have, accordingly, waived the right to argue on 
appeal that Telfer published the allegedly false statements more 
broadly than necessary. '"[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal [,] 
the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the 
trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.'" 438 Main Street v. 
Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, <J[ 51, 99 P.3d 801 (quoting Brookside 
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Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, f 14, 48 P.3d 968) 
(alterations in original). Issues not raised before the trial court are 
usually deemed waived. Id. 
Strand and Allen also note on appeal that prosecutors do not enjoy 
absolute immunity when they perform investigatory functions. Op. Br. 
at 27-28. But Telfer is not a prosecutor, the plaintiffs were not 
prosecuted, and their claims against Telfer do not relate to any 
investigation she performed. Strand's and Allen's claims for libel and 
slander relate solely to the motion Telfer filed with the court and the 
discussions she had with affiants in the course of preparing it.1 R. 9-14. 
Therefore, Telfer's investigation is not at issue. 
Finally, Strand and Allen seem to suggest in their brief that Telfer 
failed to follow Utah's statutory procedure for reporting child abuse and 
characterize the motion filed in the divorce case as Telfer's effort to 
1
 Strand and Allen argue that Telfer sent an investigator to their 
home to do an evaluation. Op. Br. at 27. They fault Telfer for relying 
upon statements made by Renee and the children's paternal aunt and 
cousin instead of statements of the investigator. Op. Br. at 19. Strand 
and Allen argue that this constitutes unconstitutional suppression of 
exculpatory evidence for which Telfer does not enjoy immunity. Op. Br. 
at 27. However, the plaintiffs were not entitled to these protections 
because they were not criminal defendants. Moreover, the investigator's 
report is not in the record. Accordingly, the plaintiffs cannot show that 
it was favorable to them. 
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induce the trial court to rule that Strand and Allen were guilty of child 
abuse. Op. Br. at 26, 29-32. Strand and Allen correctly observe that 
Utah law gives statutory immunity to those who report suspicions of 
child abuse in good faith. Utah Code Ann. Section 62A-4a-410 provides: 
Any person, official, or institution participating in good 
faith in making a report, taking photographs or X-rays, 
assisting an investigator from the division, serving as a 
member of a child protection team, or taking a child into 
protective custody pursuant to this part, is immune from 
any liability, civil or criminal, that otherwise might result 
by reason of those actions. 
Strand and Allen correctly argue that the statutory immunity did 
not attach in this case because Telfer did not make a report of child 
abuse. Id. Nevertheless, the statutory immunity does not replace or 
diminish the separate common law judicial proceeding privilege. The 
elements of that privilege unquestionably are met in this case and 
Strand's and Allen's complaint was properly dismissed. 
Conclusion 
The statements that give rise to Strand's and Allen's libel and 
slander claims were made in court papers Telfer filed in her capacity as 
guardian ad litem for the children in Rex and Renee's divorce action. 
Telfer is an attorney and the statements were relevant to and made in 
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the course of a judicial proceeding. Under Utah law, there is no 
question that Telfer is immune from Strand's and Allen's claims. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly granted Telfer's motion to dismiss 
and Telfer urges this Court to affirm the judgment entered by the trial 
court. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 20th day of February, 2007. 
Reha Deal 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Diana Telfer 
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